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A B S T R A C T
In this paper, we propose a scenario framework that could provide a scenario ‘‘thread’’ through the
different climate research communities (climate change – vulnerability, impact, and adaptation - and
mitigation) in order to support assessment of mitigation and adaptation strategies and climate impacts.
The scenario framework is organized around a matrix with two main axes: radiative forcing levels and
socio-economic conditions. The radiative forcing levels (and the associated climate signal) are described
by the new Representative Concentration Pathways. The second axis, socio-economic developments
comprises elements that affect the capacity for mitigation and adaptation, as well as the exposure to
climate impacts. The proposed scenarios derived from this framework are limited in number, allow for
comparison across various mitigation and adaptation levels, address a range of vulnerability
characteristics, provide information across climate forcing and vulnerability states and span a full
century time scale. Assessments based on the proposed scenario framework would strengthen
cooperation between integrated-assessment modelers, climate modelers and vulnerability, impact and
adaptation researchers, and most importantly, facilitate the development of more consistent and
comparable research within and across these research communities.
 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Long-term global scenarios of the evolution of human and
natural earth systems are an important tool for the assessment of
climate change. The main rationale for using scenarios is that
climate change is a slow process, where decisions today can have
irreversible consequences for decades or even centuries. Large
uncertainties play a role in exploring these consequences (e.g. for* Corresponding author at: Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, P.O.
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economic development). Scenario analysis has been developed as a
tool to explore different futures under clearly deﬁned assumptions.
This simpliﬁcation facilitates a focus on a ﬁnite number of
potential future developments, particularly with regard to future
states of socio-economic variables, e.g. energy, land use, land cover,
emissions of greenhouse gases, aerosols and short lived species,
and climate (Henrichs et al., 2010).
In climate research, scenarios are used by three broad sets of
researchers: the climate modeling community, the integrated
assessment modeling community, and the vulnerability, impacts,
and adaptation community (corresponding also with the three
working groups of IPCC) (Moss et al., 2010). Each group uses
scenarios in different ways and for different purposes. The
requirements for scenarios differ among these research commu-
nities, with different emphasis on scenario elements and different
approaches. At the same time, the communities collaborate in their
1 OECD90, REF (primarily Eastern and Central European countries and newly
independent states of the former Soviet Union undergoing economic reform), Asia
(including centrally-planned Asia and China as well as other Paciﬁc Asian
countries), and Africa and Latin America.
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Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), with IPCC’s
working groups corresponding to each of the three major research
communities. While each community will inevitably use a set of
very speciﬁc scenarios, it is also important to think about cases
where information of all three research communities is used. Such
studies would be able to illustrate the interactions among
adaptation and mitigation responses, or deal more effectively
with the challenge of understanding multiple stresses. There is a
clear beneﬁt from both a scientiﬁc and a policy perspective if some
subset of scenarios provides a connecting and integrative thread
that runs through the research assessed by all three communities.
Currently, a set of new scenarios are being developed to support
climate research in the next few years (Moss et al., 2008, 2010).
More so than in earlier exercises, the new scenarios are intended to
stimulate cooperation and coordination between the three
research communities identiﬁed above.
The new scenario process began with the creation of Represen-
tative Concentration Pathways (RCPs); scenarios designed to help
climate modelers explore the range of potential future greenhouse
emissions and concentration pathways (Van Vuuren et al., 2011a).
Following the development of the RCPs, Moss et al. (2010) calls for a
‘‘parallel phase’’ in which the climate modeling community uses the
RCPs to develop ensembles of climate change scenarios while the
integrated assessment modeling and ‘vulnerability, impacts, and
adaptation’ communities jointly develop new scenarios. There are
several key challenges involved in developing scenarios in this way.
First of all, there are many factors that are relevant in the context of
the research of three research communities. These factors somehow
need to be grouped to form a limited, manageable and coherent set
of common scenarios. A second challenge is that the relevant factors
for mitigation and adaptation often act at different spatial and
temporal scales. Scenarios therefore should be able to bridge these
scales, by providing enough information on global trends and
processes (e.g. international economic factors, international insti-
tutional factors and demographic trends) without over-determining
local or sector scale processes or conditions that are best determined
by local analysts in response to local user needs (Toth, 2003).
In this context, the purpose of this paper is to propose a scenario
framework (including a deﬁnition of socio-economic scenarios)
that could be used as the basis for new community scenarios that
act as a thread for mitigation, adaptation and impact assessments
and at the same time are consistent with the RCPs that deﬁne the
climate dimension.
We dividethis overarching question into several sub-questions in
Section 2 – which are subsequently addressed in Sections 3, 4 and 5.
For deriving these subquestions, we ﬁrst describe the ongoing
activities with respect to coordinated use of scenarios across the
threeresearch communities, focusing especially on the development
and use of the RCPs (Section 2). In Section 3, we discuss the
information needs of the integrated assessment and ‘vulnerability,
impacts, and adaptation’ community. Next in Section 4, we discuss
the information on some important socio-economic variables
needed for integrated assessment and ‘vulnerability, impacts, and
adaptation community’ work (as identiﬁed in Section 3) as included
in the RCPs and in other scenario literature. Finally, in Section 5 we
discuss a possible framework that may be used for future scenarios
research. The same question is also looked at by Kriegler et al. (2010).
2. New scenarios and the role of the Representative
Concentration Pathways
Over the last decade, the so-called SRES scenarios (Nakicenovic
and Swart, 2000) have been extensively used in climate change
research and assessments. The SRES scenarios (named after their
publication, ‘‘Special Report on Emission Scenarios’’) provided sixalternative descriptions of how the future may develop based on a
coherent and internally consistent set of assumptions about the
key relationships and driving forces that could be used in
combination with a set of climate model projections that employed
the greenhouse gas emissions pathways of these scenarios. The
SRES scenarios were based on narrative storylines that conveyed
the overall logic underlying the related quantitative descriptions of
future economic, demographic, technology, and emissions trends.
These storylines highlighted two key uncertainties; the degree of
international cooperation and the level of focus on sustainability
issues. These narratives provided a framework that facilitated
extrapolation of scenarios for other research. The data in the SRES
scenarios were provided globally and for four broad regions.1 This
was adequate for their intended purposes of providing inputs to
climate modeling and long-term global mitigation analysis, but
additional efforts were needed to translate the scenarios to
regional or national scales as needed for ‘vulnerability, impacts,
and adaptation’ research purposes, in a meaningful way, e.g. by
downscaling or developing additional ‘‘nested’’ scenarios (consis-
tent with the global scenarios) (Van Vuuren et al., 2010).
According to Moss et al. (2010), there are three main reasons for
developing a new set of scenarios. First of all, the SRES scenarios only
considereddevelopmentsinthe absence of climatepolicy.Sincethen,
a considerable amount of literature has emerged that looks into
mitigation scenarios, responding to a shift in policy attention away
from the need for climate policy to evaluate the costs and beneﬁts of
different types of climate policy (see Clarke et al., 2010; Edenhofer
et al., 2010; Fisher et al., 2007; Van Vuuren et al., 2007). Second, new
advances in climate models have led to a need for more detailed
scenario information than was provided by SRES: aerosol emissions,
geographically explicit descriptions of land use and emissions and
detailed speciﬁcation of emissions by source type. Third, there is a
need for closer collaboration between the different disciplines
involved in climate scenario formulation and use to allow for
consistent usage ofscenarios for the differentobjectivesandmethods
of the modeling (as discussed in Section 1). This collaboration has
been built into the design process for the new scenarios.
The process for developing the new scenarios is somewhat
different than earlier exercises. It is intended to shorten scenario
development time, while also promoting cooperation across the
research communities. The development process consists of three
phases: (1) the preparatory phase, (2) the parallel phase and (3) the
integration phase. In the preparatory phase, four existing scenarios
were selected from the published literature. The emission and
concentration pathways associated with these four scenarios are
referred to as Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs). In
the subsequent, parallel phase of the process, climate model runs
are performed using the RCPs, while at the same time the
integrated assessment and ‘vulnerability, impacts, and adaptation’
research communities develop appropriate storylines and new
socio-economic scenarios (consistent with the RCPs) to inform
research on both mitigation and adaptation. In the ﬁnal integration
phase, the results from the climate modeling and socio-economic
narrative and quantitative scenario development activities will be
brought together to form the ﬁnal set of integrated scenarios.
The RCPs are intended to form a key element of the new process.
They were selected to span a wide range for those factors that
determine future climate change (radiative forcing of greenhouse
gases and land use change). Each RCP was reviewed for internal
consistency of the whole scenario, but only the information on
emissions, concentrations and land use are released as the RCPs
2 Note that ‘‘Vulnerability’’ is sometimes used to refer speciﬁcally to the last two
factors.
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assessment and ‘vulnerability, impacts, and adaptation’ commu-
nities would work together on the desired characteristics for the
socio-economic scenarios.
The RCPs have been selecting from existing literature to span
the full range of possible trajectories for future greenhouse
concentration through 2100. In total 4 scenarios were selected
from 4 different modeling groups: a very high emission scenario
leading to 8.5 W/m2 (Riahi et al., 2007, 2011), a high stabilization
scenario leading to 6 W/m2 (Masui et al., 2011), an intermediate
stabilization scenario leading to 4.5 W/m2 (Clarke et al., 2007;
Thomson et al., 2011) and a low mitigation scenario (2.6 W/m2)
(Van Vuuren et al., 2007, 2011b). The original scenarios were
further processed to harmonize base year emissions and land use.
The new scenarios are thus intended to connect work on
climate change, impacts and adaptation and mitigation. In this
paper, we concentrate on the role of scenarios as an input for
analysis of potential climate change impacts and the role of
adaptation in ameliorating them, while at the same time
considering the interplay between mitigation and adaptation.
We discuss a parallel phase approach for the integrated assessment
and ‘vulnerability, impacts, and adaptation’ communities to
collaborate in the development of socio-economic narratives
and scenarios that can supplement the RCPs and facilitate research
coordination across ‘vulnerability, impacts, and adaptation’ and
mitigation studies.
In Section 2, we indicated that the main focus of this paper is the
question: to propose a scenario framework (including a deﬁnition
of socio-economic scenarios) that could be used as the basis for
new community scenarios that act as a thread for mitigation,
adaptation and impact assessments while also being consistent
with the RCPs that deﬁne the climate dimension. Based on the
discussion in this section, we can subdivide this into three
subquestions:
(1) What are the main dimensions and characteristics of socio-
economic scenarios that provide sufﬁcient context for both
‘vulnerability, impacts, and adaptation’ and mitigation analysis
and what are the required components for a common
socioeconomic thread? (Section 3)?
(2) Can available socio-economic information underlying the RCPs
and other scenario studies be easily used to support such a
common scenario framework (Section 4)?
(3) Is it possible to develop a scenario framework for mitigation,
adaptation, and impact assessment (Section 5)?
For question 1, we ﬁrst discuss the information needs of
‘vulnerability, impacts, and adaptation’ and mitigation analysis
(Section 3.1/Section 3.2) and next derive a set of criteria for
scenarios that could act as a thread between these communities.
We also indicate a set of crucial indicators (Section 3.3/Section 3.4).
For question 2, we ﬁrst look into a set of key socio-economic
variables for IAV and mitigation analysis (derived in Section 3)
and discuss whether the information in the socio-economic
scenarios underlying the RCPs and other scenario literature can
be directly used to build up a common scenario framework, or,
in case it cannot be used directly, what this information implies
for such a framework. The same question is also addressed by
looking into the type of scenarios available in the scenario
literature in general. In Section 3.4, this information is used to
derive a set of key conclusions for a future scenario framework.
Finally, in Section 5 we propose a framework that could form
the basis of joint impact/mitigation analysis, on the basis of the
information needs and criteria derived in Section 3, and the
assessment of current scenario work in Section 4.3. Main dimensions and characteristics of scenarios useful for
joint impact/mitigation analysis
3.1. Vulnerability, impact, and adaptation analysis
The consequences of changes in climate for society depend not
only on climate variables, but also on characteristics inherent to
the exposed system (Parry et al., 2007). Drawing from a non-
climate change example, the importance of different socio-
economic contexts in determining ‘‘damages’’ from a natural
disaster can be seen in the very different impacts that occurred in
Chile and Haiti in response to earthquakes during 2009 and 2010.
In Haiti, where the death toll was high and damage extensive,
infrastructure was poorly maintained and designed, internal
emergency response capacity was low, and local resources for
long-term recovery were very limited. In Chile, on the other hand,
better basic infrastructure and superior response capacity was
credited with limiting mortality and physical damage, while
greater ﬁnancial capacity, better education, better institutions and
greater access to technical resources contributed to hastening
recovery and rebuilding efforts.
In the climate change impacts literature, the extent to which
the system is unable to cope with a hazard is often referred to as
‘‘vulnerability’’ (Fu¨ssell, 2007; Fu¨ssell and Klein, 2006; Klein et al.,
2007; Moss and Malone, 2001; O’Brien et al., 2004; Parry et al.,
2007), although this is described somewhat differently in different
studies. In order to describe the future vulnerability, qualitative
and quantitative information on societal developments (such as
those captured in socio-economic scenarios) are used. In contrast
to mitigation, societal development trends are more important for
adaptation than speciﬁc climate policy. Thus, the assessment of
vulnerability, impacts and adaptation requires not only a descrip-
tion of expected climate change, but also associated a description
of socio-economic conditions. In brief, vulnerability to climate
change is typically seen as a function of exposure (exp), sensitivity
of the exposed system (sens) and adaptation capacity (AC), thus
V = f (Exp, Sens, AC). ‘‘Impact’’ is usually interpreted as the
combination of the ﬁrst two factors.2
Future exposure to climate change is related to biophysical
factors such as changes in average temperature, precipitation as
well as extreme weather events, but also indirect changes like river
ﬂows. Projections of future exposure to climate variables are made
by climate models or speciﬁc impact models. They are related to
both natural climate variability and forcing factors (e.g. volcanic
aerosols, variations in solar output) and to changes in climate that
result from the anthropogenic forcing factors that deﬁne the RCPs
(concentrations of greenhouse gases and air pollutants and land
use) – although clearly uncertainty exists in the response of the
climate system to forcing. As impacts occur in particular places at
local to regional scale, downscaling methods are sometimes used
to translate the coarse information of climate models to the
relevant geographic scale. Sensitivity is the extent of change in the
structure or function of a system as a result of exposure to climate
change. It is a function of the assets exposed to change, which is
dependent on a range of socio-economic conditions, including
population change, economic development, and technological
change.
Future vulnerability is more complex. This is partly because
there are a very large number of factors that determine future
vulnerability which are highly dependent on context and scale of
analysis. It is inﬂuenced by the magnitude of the exposed system
(e.g. number of people at risk), the sensitivity of the exposed
system (e.g. the potential impacts on the affected system per unit
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indicates that adaptive capacity is inﬂuenced by factors that are
difﬁcult to quantify, such social capital (Adger, 2003), institutions
and governance, technological capabilities and level of economic
development (Brooks et al., 2005), and scenarios for these
inﬂuences are easiest to deﬁne in narrative terms. Climate
vulnerability is therefore a function of an interaction between
social and biophysical vulnerabilities, interpreted in quantitative
and qualitative ways. Proximal vulnerabilities commonly men-
tioned in the literature include sensitivity, coping and adaptive
capacities, hazard, and exposure, all of which processes occur at
multiple scales with cross-scale interactions (Preston and Stafford-
Smith, 2009). Adding likelihoods to the components of vulnerabil-
ity leads to an expression of risk. Risk is a useful notion for policy-
relevant impact assessments, but it remains controversial to make
operational due to the fundamental uncertainties and subjectiv-
ities of assigning likelihoods. Attempts have been made usually on
the basis of expert elicitation, such as by Morgan et al. (2006) and
Zickfeld et al. (2007, 2010).
In current impact studies, the future impacts are assessed in a
variety of ways. In part of the studies, socio-economic conditions
are not treated explicitly or are unrealistically held constant
(Berkhout and Hertin, 2000). Sometimes, relevant socio-economic
conditions can be derived by ‘‘downscaling’’ the information on the
socio-economic drivers of scenario studies such as population and
economic development (Van Vuuren et al., 2010). But at the same
more speciﬁc information on local and short-term factors
(including policy) can be accounted for. Each of these methods
has strengths and weaknesses associated with it, and should
properly be used only for those analyses for which they are
appropriate. There are several examples of studies that used SRES
socio-economic development pathways (population, GDP, em-
ployment, etc.) downscaled to the local level (Carter et al., 2004;
Martens et al., 2006; Rounsevell et al., 2008). For many other
‘vulnerability, impacts, and adaptation’ studies, which seek to
embed analysis of the potential robustness or performance of
different locally- (or sectorally-) relevant adaptation strategies
within the broader context of uncertain socio-economic or climate
futures, it is better to use locally-derived scenarios reﬂecting
development choices that can be embedded in broader ‘‘bounding
scenarios’’ of future global development and climate trends.
Berkhout et al. (2002) and Zurek and Henrichs (2007) describe a
potential application of this approach. A key area of cooperation
between the integrated assessment and ‘vulnerability, impacts,
and adaptation’ research communities is developing narrative
storylines and socio-economic scenarios of development pathways
that focus on trends at the scale of the international system and
large regions. For reasons stated earlier, it is desirable that for some
of these scenarios, an analytic relationship between the socio-
economic conditions and RCPs be maintained, so that internally-
consistent scenarios of climate change and socio-economic futures
can be applied. Identifying the content of these scenarios requires
cooperation between ‘vulnerability, impacts, and adaptation’ and
integrated assessment researchers, so that the focus is properly on
global forces that shape local conditions, rather than on trying to
derive local conditions from global processes, conditions, or
models that are not appropriate for this purpose and that do
not reﬂect the interest of the local decision-makers for the speciﬁc
topic at hand. Proper reﬂection of these cross-scale dependencies
will require a system in which scenarios can be nested at different
geographic levels.
3.2. Mitigation analysis
A key part of the mitigation literature concentrates on the
feasibility of different climate targets, often deﬁned by concentra-tion or radiative forcing levels, and the associated costs (Clarke
et al., 2010; Edenhofer et al., 2010; Fisher et al., 2007; Weyant et
al., 2006). Research and assessment have identiﬁed critical factors
in mitigation scenarios (Fisher et al., 2007):
(1) Factors that are part of the socio-economic assumptions
underlying the scenarios, such as population growth, economic
growth, technology development and societal preferences with
respect to fuel choice;
(2) The assumed form of international climate policy (the level of
participation of different countries and sectors; the coverage of
various gases);
(3) The assumed instrumentation of climate policy (carbon tax;
cap-and-trade; regulation etc.);
(4) The assumed availability and improvement of different
technologies;
(5) The ambition of the climate policy.
So-far, a large part of the literature has concentrated on so-
called ‘ﬁrst-best’ worlds, that assume an optimal situation for
international policy (full participation; i.e. factor b), instrumenta-
tion (international tax or cap-and-trade; factor c), and technology
(no deliberate exclusions; factor d). The IPCC report also concluded
that there was a clear correlation of mitigation costs with the
underlying socio-economic assumptions (Fisher et al., 2007;
Morita and Robinson, 2001).
Since AR4, several studies have focused on estimating the
inﬂuence of non-optimal situations for factors b–d, generally
referred to as ‘second-best’ worlds (examples include Clarke et al.,
2010; Edenhofer et al., 2010; Rao et al., 2008; Tavoni and Tol,
2010). Not only do these scenarios result in higher mitigation costs,
in some cases, ambitious mitigation targets are found to be
unachievable. In the coming years, several integrated assessment
model comparison projects will focus on this line of research.
Planned research projects include identifying the costs of various
climate targets as function of technology and climate policy
assumptions (EMF-24) and the reproduction of the RCPs using
additional integrated assessment models. Identiﬁcation of costs as
a function of various assumptions about future climate policy is
identiﬁed as a key priority.
It should be noted that most global scenario exercises to date,
including SRES, have generally taken a relatively positive approach
by assuming continued economic growth, an often decreasing
(relative) income gap between developing and industrialized
countries, and sustained technological advances. Extreme scenari-
os which make very different assumptions or deal with abrupt
social and economic changes are generally not considered. Also,
the potentially negative feedback of possible large climate change
impacts on general development patterns are generally ignored.
3.3. Integration of impact and mitigation analysis: potential role of
RCPs and scenario literature
3.3.1. Key factors for relevant scenarios
For Sections 3.1 and 3.2 several key factors can be identiﬁed that
would determine the relevance of socio-economic scenarios for
future assessment of vulnerability and impacts in combination
with mitigation.
(1) Limited number. The set of scenarios should be as small as
possible, consistent with other scenario design criteria. One of
the central roles of scenarios is to provide focus. A small
number of scenarios can perform the role of tying together
information from all climate research communities and could
therefore be the foundation for a synthesis for policy makers.
Table 1
Examples of potential socioeconomic variables.
Variable (regional) Resolution
Population Region
Economic output (GDP) Region & sector
Economic consumption Region
Primary energy Region & fuel
Final energy Region, sector, & fuel
Land-use Region, activity type, & grid
Agricultural production Region & broad category
Net trade Region & sector
D.P. van Vuuren et al. / Global Environmental Change 22 (2012) 21–35 25Scenario usefulness in that regard degrades as the number of
scenarios becomes large.
(2) Comprehensive. The framework needs to cover sufﬁciently
different future development to represent a plausible range of
assumptions and thus represent relevant uncertainties. Within
this framework, RCPs can provide this range for climate
outcomes. These need to be combined with ranges of socio-
economic pathways and qualitative information (or storylines),
addressing the interplay between mitigation, adaptation as
well as resulting impacts that future societies might have to
cope with.
(3) Comparability. The scenario set should make it possible for at
least some research knowledge generated in one community to
be compared with information generated n another communi-
ty. For example, the cost estimates generated by a mitigation
scenario should be predicated on similar key assumptions as
the information generated with regard to impacts and
adaptation. For example, if the mitigating world has low
income and poor social organization skills, then it would be
extremely useful to have information about climate change,
climate impacts and climate adaptation predicated on those
same income and societal characteristics.
(4) Vulnerability and mitigative capacity. Relevant dimensions
include those that determine vulnerability (adaptive capacity
and sensitivity) and mitigative capacity (baseline assumptions
and the level of participation in international climate policy).
The IPCC Third Assessment Report concluded that ‘‘both
mitigation costs and net damages, in turn, depend on some
crucial baseline assumptions: economic development and
baseline emissions largely determine emissions reduction
costs, while development and institutions inﬂuence vulnera-
bility and adaptive capacity’’ suggesting that it might be
possible to deﬁne relevant axes for both research areas (IPCC,
2001). The scenario set should provide a mechanism for
understanding the range of differences between potential
socio-economic circumstances for mitigation, impacts and
adaptation.
(5) Information across climate outcomes. The set of scenarios
should provide a means of tying information from all three
climate research communities together in a way that highlights
the differences between alternative potential climate futures.
For example, it would be extremely useful to document the
differences between a world that limits radiative forcing to
2.6 Wm2 in 2100 and one which limits radiate forcing to
4.5 Wm2. Whereas previous assessments concentrated on
illustrating the outcomes of scenarios that did not include
climate policy, AR5 could begin to generate information that
would inform more precise decision making by articulating
implications for mitigation, climate change, impacts and
adaptation decisions given different assumptions about
climate forcings. Similarly, the scenarios should provide
information about how mitigation, impacts and adaptation
differs against alternative socio-economic backgrounds.
(6) Multiscale. The storylines need provide enough explicit
information on the aggregated scale to be clearly distinguish-
able. This is an additional reason for a small number of
scenarios. At the same time, they need to provide enough
ﬂexibility for interpretation at more detailed scales or
consistent incorporation of scenarios developed for lower
levels of scale (regions or sectors).
(7) Time scales. The scenario set should enable information about
mitigation, impacts and adaptation at short, mid and long time
scales. That is, for time frames ranging from the present to 2100
with some time intervals.
(8) Structured but ﬂexible. The scenario set should provide
enough structure to facilitate consistency and offer context andcalibration points for the various ‘vulnerability, impacts, and
adaptation’ and mitigation analyses. However, the set should
not be too prescriptive, but instead offer ﬂexibility for deﬁning
relevant details, as well as opportunities for exploring
uncertainties.
Finally, we recognize that many impact and mitigation analyses
are still based on SRES. It would be useful if the framework could
provide a broad enough taxonomy to retain comparability to these
ongoing assessments. It is worth noting that the scenario
framework we propose would be a thread through integrative
climate research (and AR5 in particular). The framework, however,
is not intended to be comprehensive. It is not intended to span all
possible dimensions in any realm. For example, the particular set of
climate forcings leaves potentially interesting cases, such as for
example stabilization at 3.7 W/m2, unexplored. Similarly, a small
set of scenarios would be unable to explore all of the dimensions
vulnerability. Many scenarios developed for speciﬁc question
within each research community will be developed outside the
framework. For example, integrated assessment researchers are
already exploring the roles of key characteristics such as
technology and policy architecture (Clarke et al., 2010; Edenhofer
et al., 2010). As long as these are formulated as typical mitigation
questions they would be unexplored within the context of the
‘‘thread’’ scenarios.
3.4. Components for a common socioeconomic thread
Based on earlier scenario exercises and the criteria formulated
in the previous section, a common socioeconomic thread could
consist of three components that can be adopted by the vast
assortment of climate researchers: (1) a common conceptual
framework; (2) simple socio-economic narratives and (3) a lean set
of quantiﬁed variables.
The components need only provide a common structure and
external context that will offer consistency and calibration points.
They should not be overly prescriptive and instead offer
researchers plenty of ﬂexibility for specifying details and exploring
sensitivities. In a subsequent section we propose a broad
conceptual framework for framing options and issues to consider
in developing a scenarios design. To characterize the state of the
literature and reﬂect upon scenario needs, we ﬁrst consider current
socioeconomic scenarios relative to the RCPs. Narratives are a
valuable means for providing qualitative context and guidance for
the development of detailed supplemental information to accom-
pany the variables provided with the thread. As for quantiﬁcation,
a limited number of variables are prudent to provide a skeleton of
consistent information on which researchers can hang details
relevant to their research and off of which they can explore
uncertainties—sectorally, temporally, and spatially. Table 1 pro-
vides a list of candidate variables and resolution for supporting
impact and mitigation research at many scales (but other variables
may be added). Fine resolution socioeconomic results are certainly
possible given downscaling techniques. However, they are more
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quantiﬁed information.
3.5. Position of the RCPs
As indicated earlier, the RCPs are an appropriate starting point
for any framework as they will already form an important
connection between integrated assessment and climate modeling
research and assessment. In that context, the scenarios underlying
each individual RCP provide an internally consistent description of
population, income, energy, land use, other relevant driving forces
and emissions. However, this is not the case for the set of RCPs.
Each RCP and scenario originates from a different modeling team
and comes from a speciﬁc study, with its own research questions
and assumptions on future developments. There is therefore no a
priori reason why the set as a whole would necessarily be
representative of the literature for parameters other than radiative
forcing (and directly related variables). Neither does the set a priori
have an internal logic other than the radiative forcing character-
istics on which it is based. It would, however, still be possible that
other scenario characteristics would show clear correlation with
radiative forcing. Very different modeling and socioeconomic
scenarios generated by integrated assessment models can yield
essentially indistinguishable concentration pathways, depending
on many factors, among them the particular policy instruments
chosen for implementation (Clarke et al., 2010).
In order to analyze the consistency of variables between
scenarios, we have undertaken a literature review of the socio-
economic ranges in the scenario literature, including the RCPs, in
relation to radiative forcing level (Section 4). The analysis is based
on three main sources. The ﬁrst two are (1) the scenario literature
as included in the scenario database compiled for IPCC AR4 (Fisher
et al., 2007; Nakicenovic et al., 2006) and (2) the results of the
recent model comparison project EMF-22 (Clarke et al., 2010). We
have analyzed these sets to determine the relevant literature
ranges and to look for evidence of correlation between socio-
economic parameters and radiative forcing levels. In addition, we
have used the socio-economic scenarios underlying the RCPs and
RCP replications by other models within the RCP development
process.
In this overview, we focus on the individual parameters (e.g.
population, income, energy use) that are of critical importance for
mitigation and ‘vulnerability, impacts, and adaptation’ issues. A
crucial question for scenario development, therefore, is whether
there are certain theoretically or historically derived relationships2000 202 0 204 0 20 60 208 0 210 0
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Fig. 1. Overview of population scenarios in the literature in relation to the RCP radiative fo
2011; Riahi et al., 2011; Thomson et al., 2011; Van Vuuren et al., 2011b)), the scenario d
range of scenarios consistent forcing levels comparable to each RCP (colour codes). The gr
references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of thbetween the parameter values that make some combinations
likely or unlikely. For instance, is there a reason to assume that the
combination of low radiative forcing (i.e. RCP2.6) and high
economic growth (or high population growth) is unlikely. The
questions are complicated – as they relate to future trends (and
historical evidence can therefore only be used with care).
Therefore, instead we focus on the outcomes of models and have
to assume that together these models provide a set of meaningful
information.
It should also be noted that in our analysis we focus solely on
results at the global level, (consistent with the questions raised in
Sections 1 and 2 of this paper). The literature assessed for this
paper mostly assumes full participation in climate policy (but not
all). Finally, We refer to the scenarios underlying the RCPs as IM-
2.6, GCAM4.5, AIM6.0 and MES8.5, in order to emphasize that the
RCPs themselves only include the emission, land use and
concentrations information. Together this set is referred to as
the original RCP scenarios.
4. Socio-economic driving forces: comparison of the RCPs with
available literature
4.1. Quantitative evaluation of the RCPs with respect to socio-
economic driving forces
In our quantitative evaluation of the RCPs, we focus on 4 major
parameters: population, income, primary energy use and CO2
emissions. Note that while all four are of fundamental importance
for mitigation research, only the ﬁrst two are generally of relevance
for ‘vulnerability, impacts, and adaptation’ research.
4.1.1. Population
Three of the four underlying scenarios for the RCPs are based on
a global population scenario reaching 8.5–9.5 billion people in
2100. MES-8.5 forms an exception as it deliberately assumes a
higher global population. The IM-2.6, GCAM4.5 and AIM6 scenarios
all deliberately aim to follow an intermediate population pathway
consistent with the medium UN projections published over the last
few years and most of the population projections currently used in
integrated assessment models (EMF-22) (Fig. 1).
In the EMF-22 set, no relation is observed between radiative
forcing levels and population level (see Fig. 1). This is conﬁrmed by
plotting the population data in the EMF-22 data against the
cumulative CO2 emissions (correlating well with radiative forcing)
in Fig. 2. It should be noted that population is exogenous to nearlyAR4-database + RCP
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Fig. 2. 2100 income and population level in the EMF22 scenarios (Clarke et al., 2010) versus the cumulative CO2 emissions from energy/industry sources. Cumultive CO2
emissions correlate closely with the radiative forcing levels.
D.P. van Vuuren et al. / Global Environmental Change 22 (2012) 21–35 27all models; thus, population for use in scenarios is typically derived
from projections made independently of integrated assessment
models. The range of population projections included in the AR4
database is much wider than the range drawn upon in for the
scenarios underlying the RCPs. Many of the scenarios in the AR4
dataset deliberately explored the impacts of different storylines
and their implications for demographic developments. Moreover,
the database includes some relatively old scenarios (e.g. from
2000) that used higher population projections. Within this
database, it can be shown that the range of population projections
in the literature for the scenarios underlying the three highest RCPs
(in terms of radiative forcing) is equal to the full literature range
(excluding the extreme tails of the distribution). Interestingly, for
the scenarios leading to radiative forcing levels consistent with the
RCP2.6 a somewhat reduced population range is found, but even
here the range still covers the highest of the original scenarios of
the RCPs. In other words, a lower radiative forcing levels seems not
to coincide easily with population levels above 12 billion. This is
consistent with some earlier studies that reported that very low
radiative forcing levels cannot be achieved from very high
population levels.
4.1.2. Income
The total set of scenarios (IM2.6, GCAM4.5, AIM6 and
MES8.5) behind the RCPs projects a GDP level ranging from
200 to 300 trillion US$ in 2100. These GDP levels are consistent
with those reported in the recent scenario literature as part of
the EMF-22 project. Within the set, AIM6 and MES8.5 show
relatively low values and IM2.6 and GCAM4.5 relatively high
values. One could formulate different hypothesis about expected
relationships between income and radiative forcing levels. First,
most models assume that (more) stringent climate policy will
lead to costs and thus to (somewhat) lower GDP (everything else
being equal). Second, lower levels of economic activity will
make it easier to reduce emissions to very low levels. Third, a
very slow development of GDP is likely to coincide with
relatively slow technology development or ability to ﬁnance
more costly technologies and implying higher emissions - the
opposite relationship compared to that predicted by the ﬁrst 2
hypotheses.
The EMF22 study provides some insight into these hypotheses
on the relationship between climate target and GDP level. The data
shows for most individual models there is a relationship of lower
GDP levels with more stringent targets as a result of mitigation
costs, leading to a loss of per cent GDP. The differences across thescenarios of different models are in fact much larger. Apparently,
other factors (often exogenous assumptions to the models and the
causal relationships in the models) are much more dominant for
economic growth than climate policy (see Figs. 2 and 3). This result
is also seen for some of the RCP models when simulating other
radiative forcing levels: while for the individual models more
stringent climate policy leads to lower GDP the differences across
the models are much larger. In the context of these ﬁnding one
must conclude that the inverse order for the scenarios underlying
the RCPs in terms of income is ‘‘coincidental’’, i.e. based on
independent model assumptions.
4.1.3. Primary energy consumption
The scenarios behind the 4 RCPs show a wide range of outcomes
for future energy systems, both in terms of absolute consumption
levels and the type of energy used. For simplicity, we focus only on
the former here (Fig. 4). The lowest 3 RCPs result in a relatively
narrow range of 2100 primary energy consumption levels of
between 800 and 1100 EJ/year; in contrast the highest RCP leads to
primary energy consumption of 1750 EJ/year. These numbers are
consistent with those of the EMF22 model comparison. Also here,
the reference scenario range is signiﬁcantly higher than the range
for mitigation scenrios (around 700 EJ/year). The reason is that
mitigation cases rely on vigorous efﬁciency improvements.
Interestingly, it seems that the difference between 4.5 and
2.6 W/m2 scenarios is relatively small. This ﬁnding is somewhat
consistent with a conclusion reached by individual model studies
that for more stringent scenarios an increasing share of emission
reduction comes from changes in energy supply.
The same story can be seen for the alternative projections of the
RCP models: model speciﬁc assumptions are the dominant
determinant of future energy consumption, but for each model
more stringent targets lead to lower energy consumption. Finally,
in the AR4 database, it can be observed that the lowest mitigation
scenarios have a more conﬁned range for future primary energy
consumption – but no distinction can be made for the other
radiative forcing levels.
4.1.4. Emissions (CO2 emissions from energy/industrial sources)
For emissions from energy and industrial sources, as expected, a
strong correlation between the emissions and radiative forcing
level is observed in all studies (Fig. 5). The results across the
various studies (RCPs, AR4, EMF-22) are consistent, showing low
greenhouse gas emissions are needed for low radiative forcing
targets and very similar trajectories.
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In addition to the four elements focused at Section 4.1, there are
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assumes little international cooperation and consequently
little technology development and a high reliance of large Asian
economies on domestic coal resources (consistent with the
SRES A2 scenario).
(b) The RCP2.6, in contrast, emphasizes that the stringent
climate policies assumed are only possible in the case of
strong international cooperation and considerable technolo-
gy progress. These conditions would also increase adaptive
capacity.
(c) For the RCP4.5 and RCP6 scenarios, international climate policy
is also assumed (and thus international cooperation). Given the
relatively higher ﬂexibility with respect to emission reduction,
these assumptions are less critical. The 4.5 stabilization case,
while requiring international cooperation and mitigation
policies, can be reached by a large number of models evenTable 2
Characteristics of the storylines in the literature (archetypes versus important scenario 
Ecosystem Assessment (Carpenter and Pingali, 2006), IPCC SRES (Nakicenovic and Swar
International Assessment of Agricultural Science and Technology Development (Watso
Economic
optimism
Reformed
markets
Global sust
developme
Economic development Very rapid Rapid Ranging fro
slow to rap
Population growth Low Low Low 
Technology development Rapid Rapid Ranging fro
medium to
Environmental technology
development
Rapid Rapid Rapid 
Main objectives Economic growth Various goals Global sust
Environmental protection Reactive Both reactive
and proactive
Proactive 
Trade Globalization Globalization Globalizatio
Policies and institutions Policies create
open markets
Policies targeted
at market failures
Strong glob
Vulnerability Medium-high Low Low assuming delayed participation by some regions (Clarke et al.,
2010).
In the literature, different approaches can be seen with respect
to the emphasis of the storylines behind scenarios. The use of
explicit storylines to provide consistent scenario sets has, mostly in
response to the SRES work, been regularly applied in international
environmental assessments. In contrast, in more recent mitigation
studies there has been less focus on explicit storylines. Such
studies often use the more traditional approach whereby one
reference scenario depicts developments in the absence of climate
policy, and is compared to several alternative cases with climate
policy. In this approach, the focus on too many alternative
storylines for the baseline is assumed to make the analysis too
cluttered. For those studies that use explicit storylines, however,
several common elements can be recognized. In current assess-characteristics) as identiﬁed by Van Vuuren et al. (2011c) based on the Millennium
t, 2000), UNEP’s Global Environmental Outlook (UNEP, 2002; UNEP, 2007) and the
n, 2008).
ainable
nt
Regional
sustainability
Regional
competition
Business-as-usual
m
id
Medium Slow Medium
Medium High Medium
m
 rapid
Ranging from
slow to rapid
Slow Medium
Medium to rapid Slow Medium
ainability Local sustainability Security Not deﬁned
Proactive Reactive Both reactive
and proactive
n Trade barriers Trade barriers Weak globalization
al governance Local actors Strong national
governments
Mixed
Possibly low Mixed Medium
Table 3
Ranges for 2100 population, GDP and emission levels of scenarios in the literature consistent with the various RCP levels (scenarios from EMF22 (Clarke et al., 2010) and the
scenario database used for AR4 (Nakicenovic et al., 2006) (average number in each category + 10–90th percentile interval). For RCP2.6, RCP4.5 and RCP6.0, all scenarios in the
corresponding IPCC category were used (Fisher et al., 2007); for RCP8.5 scenarios were used in the category ‘‘no climate policy’’ with cumulative CO2 emissions corresponding
to 8.5 W/m2.
2100 Population (billion) 2100 GDP (2100–2000 ratio) 2100 CO2 emissions (GtC/yr)
RCP2.6 9.3 (7.1–10.5) 9.4 (7.2–12.1) 0.21 (3.8 to 1.7)
RCP4.5 9.7 (7.1–14.8) 9.9 (6.1–15.7) 5.6 (3.1–8.4)
RCP6.0 10.4 (7.1–15.1) 12.5 (7.2–20.1) 12.7 (8.7–16.9)
RCP8.5 11.0 (7.1–15.1) 13.4 (7.5–20.5) 34.2 (27.9–39.7)
D.P. van Vuuren et al. / Global Environmental Change 22 (2012) 21–3530ment literature speciﬁc scenarios families can be recognized (Van
Vuuren et al., 2011c). These common elements have been
summarized in Table 2. As these storylines are deﬁned by many
different aspects they also partly deﬁne the vulnerability of society
to climate change and therefore can provide a possible linkage to
‘vulnerability, impacts, and adaptation’ analysis. The table
provides a possible suggestion of the vulnerability designation
(column) of each storyline element (row).
4.3. Conclusions
We realize that there are limitations to the study presented in
Section 4.1 (e.g. selection bias for low scenarios all assuming full
participation; no statistical analysis and focus on the global level).
Still, we believe that the analysis above lead to the following
suggestions:
 There is a broad set of socioeconomic projections consistent with
each of the different radiative forcing pathways. This is in fact
conﬁrmed by Table 3 where the same data is presented by
indicating the scenario ranges for population, income and CO2
emissions in 2100 for scenarios consistent with each of the RCP
levels. For the ﬁrst 2 parameters, the ranges for each RCP level
strongly overlap (with a few noticeable exceptions mentioned in
Section 4.1). For CO2, there is no overlap given the strong
correlation with the radiative forcing target.
 Scenarios are available that reach each radiative forcing level
from a very wide range of sets of population, income, energy, and
other assumptions. There is some weak evidence that very low
emissions levels are not likely for very high income or population
assumptions.
 For individual studies, there often is a relationship between
income and radiative forcing level (for models that include a
feedback of mitigation on economic growth) such that stricter
targets lead to reductions in income growth. However, the
variation seems very modest when compared to the spread of
assumptions on income growth across the full set of models.
 As a set, the scenarios behind the RCPs do not explicitly provide a
logical framework for combining radiative forcing, income and
population projections; nor do they cover the full range of
possible outcomes for socio-economic variables or explicitly
include many indicators of direct relevance to ‘vulnerability,
impacts, and adaptation’ research. However, each RCP scenario
individually is based on a consistent combination of these
variables.
 For primary energy consumption, there is some correlation with
the RCP forcing levels due to the role of energy efﬁciency and
reductions as a mitigation option. The correlation between RCP
levels and emissions is, as expected, very strong.
 Especially for the low and high radiative forcing scenarios, the
combination of elements in a storyline needs to be consistent
with the forcing level. While apparently it is difﬁcult to establish
clear relationships with individual factors, In the end, a high
forcing scenario does need either something like high population
growth, low technology development, large signiﬁcant relianceon coal use (or some combination of these) in order result in high
emissions.
In fact, this formulation is very similar to the conclusion
formulated in the SRES report: Similar future GHG emissions can
result from very different socio-economic developments, and
similar developments of driving forces can result in different future
emissions (Nakicenovic and Swart, 2000). These conclusions imply
that it is not advisable to directly use the original socio-economic
pathways underlying the RCPs as a framework for impact analysis:
they do not cover the literature ranges nor are they directly
comparable to each other. Thus an alternative way to create useful
storylines for impact and mitigation research in accordance with
RCPs needs to be considered. Indeed, that was one of the
motivations for the new ‘‘parallel process’’ of scenario develop-
ment – to allow more time for development of socioeconomic
storylines and scenarios that are constructed explicitly for
exploration of ‘vulnerability, impacts, and adaptation’ research
issues (Moss et al., 2010).
5. Proposed framework for analysis
5.1. An overarching scenario framework for combining RCPs with
socio-economic pathways
In Section 3 we laid out a set of criteria for a scenario framework
for comprehensive ‘vulnerability, impacts, and adaptation’ and
mitigation analysis, based on the purposes of different scientiﬁc
communities. As discussed above, the socio-economic information
underpinning the RCPs provide only weak constraints for
accompanying socioeconomic pathways for use in impact studies.
This section thus presents a possible scenario framework that
would combine new sets of socio-economic information (narra-
tives and quantiﬁcations) with the RCPs.
Following our discussions in Section 3.1, future impacts will
depend primarily on the exposure of the affected system (related in
part to the strength of the climate change signal) as well as the
system’s sensitivity to and capacity to adapt to this signal.
The climate signal, which underlies exposure, is described by
the climate model outcomes of the RCPs and is related to the extent
of mitigation (in combination with baseline emissions) as well as
expected climate-related exposure. In other words, the higher the
climate signal, the greater the likely impacts and the more
adaptation that is expected, while the lower the climate signal the
more stringent mitigation efforts would need to be. The RCPs cover
both actual climate change (in a certain year) as well the rate of
change over time.
A second dimension of our framework describes the exposed
system and the ‘‘capacity’’ of the system to mitigate or adapt.
Clearly, this second dimension depends strongly on the extent,
pace, and direction of future social, economic and political
development. While there are many factors that can be used to
characterize socio-economic development and the ability of
societies and groups to deal with climate impacts and mitigation
challenges, for simplicity we propose to translate this into one
Fig. 6. Proposed framework for mitigation, adaptation and impact analysis on the
basis of the RCPs (the vertical axis covers the climate signal based on the RCPs,
including both current climate variables and the rate of change; the horizontal axis
covers socio-economic storylines). Note that the bars just illustrate possible
outcomes of analysis.
D.P. van Vuuren et al. / Global Environmental Change 22 (2012) 21–35 31single ‘‘dimension’’. In general, effective governance, rapid
technology development, high income growth, a high level of
international cooperation and low population numbers are all
conditions that coincide with a high capacity for both mitigation
and adaptation. In contrast, the opposite conditions, in general
terms, lead to low capacity for mitigation and adaptation. This
leads to the hypothesis that the underlying socioeconomic
conditions that favor high adaptive capacity also likely to favor
high mitigation capacity. In AR4-WG2, similar reasoning was
followed suggesting that adaptive capacity and sustainable
development had the same underlying drivers (Klein et al.,
2007). While clearly cases can be formulated where mitigative and
adaptive capacity might not be coupled, we believe that the
coupling of these factors to be justiﬁed for the purpose of
formulating a simpliﬁed scenario framework. Alternatively, one
may formulate different socio-economic scenarios along theFig. 7. Proposed framework with focus on the mitigation and ‘vulnerability, impacts, and a
baseline scenarios (dashed lines, BL) and the required mitigation effort to reduce the clim
vulnerability. Note that the colours indicate possible outcomes in the framework (the sce
references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of thsecond dimension that assume contrasting conditions for the
capacity for adaptation and mitigation (Kriegler et al., 2010).
Putting these two dimensions on the horizontal and vertical
axis of an impact matrix deﬁnes our scenario framework (Fig. 6).
An important feature of the matrix is that its individual cells
describe the interplay between adaptation and mitigation and the
resulting residual impacts. Using the matrix as an organizing
principle for research would allow researchers to explore a wide
range of relevant combinations between contributing factors. For
example, the combination of high climate signal with a low
adaptive capacity in the upper left corner leads to a world with low
adaptation, little mitigation and high impacts. In contrast, a world
with a low climate signal, but favorable socio-economic conditions
leads to a world with considerable mitigation action, some
adaptation and relatively low impacts. The framework therefore
allows exploration of the inﬂuence of different levels of the
ambition of radiative forcing targets (as a function of baseline
emissions and the target level; vertical axis), adaptive capacity and
vulnerability (horizontal axis), or similar levels of impacts
(diagonal axis) resulting from the combinations of mitigation
and adaptation measures. One important aspect of the framework
is that it includes a speciﬁc assessment of residual impact – that is,
the climate change impacts that remain once adaptation has taken
place. These impacts may be positive, but for the most part they
will be experienced as irreducible damages.
An important step in making this scenario framework salient to
the wider research community would be to deﬁne speciﬁc
characteristics of the horizontal axis, i.e. correlating the columns
of low, medium and high socio-economic development with the
societies’ capacity for mitigation and adaptation. The general
storyline elements as listed in Table 2 form an important element,
including in particular the role of institutions and their efﬁcacy as
well as governance structure, the extent of global cooperation, the
rate of technology innovation, future income levels, demographic
changes, human capital, etc. Surrogate indicators such as income,
population, technology and governance are often used in the
context of storyline development. As indicated above, storylines
for low adaptive/mitigative capacity could combine assumptions
such as high population growth, low income, relatively ineffective
governance structures with slow technological change. Thisdaptation’ dimension. The right-hand matrix gives in addition the potential range of
ate signal. The left hand matrix emphasizes the dependence on residual impacts on
narios are deﬁned using the axis – not the colour coding). (For interpretation of the
e article.)
Fig. 8. The proposed framework compared to the SRES scenarios. The 4 scenarios
underlying the RCPs and the IPCC scenarios have been added to the scheme to
indicate how it can be used as heuristic to category scenarios.
D.P. van Vuuren et al. / Global Environmental Change 22 (2012) 21–3532coincides with the common archetype found in the literature of
‘‘regional competition’’ (or fragmentation) scenarios (e.g. A2 from
the SRES set). In contrast, low population, high income, effective
governance, and rapid technological change could form the back-
bone of assumptions for high adaptive and mitigative capacity -
coinciding with the reformed market and sustainability scenarios
in the archetypes (e.g. A1/B1). Intermediate assumptions about
these factors could be used for the medium socio-economic
development path and its storyline (e.g. B2).
Some aspects of this scenario matrix might be of higher
relevance for different research communities. In Fig. 7, we further
disentangle speciﬁc interpretations of the scenario framework for
the impact and mitigation dimensions.
As illustrated, speciﬁcally for impact assessments the storylines
will need to provide sufﬁcient context to specify societies’
vulnerability to climate change which is usually very much
dependent on the local and regional context. A typical analysis
could for example explore uncertainties of future impacts given a
speciﬁc climate signal (or RCP level). The vulnerability might be
explored as function of typical development parameters (e.g.
economic growth) but also in terms of governance or preparedness
to climate change (e.g. in developed countries to increased
intensity of hurricanes or heatwaves). For this purpose ‘‘horizontal
consistency’’ of providing contrasting socio-economic storylines
that deﬁne alternative levels of vulnerability and adaptive capacity
is of central importance.
On the other hand, ‘‘vertical consistency’’ might play a more
important role for the typical mitigation analysis that would aim at
understanding what it would take to reduce emissions and hence
the climate signal from a high RCP level to a lower one. Such an
analysis would need to be conditional on one single storyline (i.e.
within a column) that provides sufﬁcient information for deﬁning a
baseline for climate mitigation analysis. Thus, columns could be
understood from the mitigation perspective as sets of different
reference scenarios and mitigation counterparts to reduce emis-
sions. Obviously, speciﬁc implications for mitigation costs or
feasibility of low targets would be conditional on the speciﬁc
column and its storyline. As illustrated in Fig. 7, mitigation costs
are likely to be highest for socio-economic pathways that combine
‘‘low’’ assumptions about technology innovation, global gover-
nance and collaboration and thus have relatively lower mitigation
capacity.An important feature of the scenario framework is also that it
provides a ﬂexible taxonomy into which many earlier and present
scenario assessments can be placed. Fig. 8 shows the relative
position of the SRES and RCP socio-economic pathways within the
matrix and the colour coding now corresponds to residual impacts.
Similarly, also other scenarios such as those discussed in Table 2
could be placed into individual cells of the matrix according to the
characteristics of their storylines (too some degree the assignment
of the scenarios includes arbitrary decisions, as the columns have
not been unambiguously deﬁned yet). The framework thus
provides thus not only a broader logic for how to pair socio-
economic storylines with the RCPs, but also continuity and
comparability with earlier important scenario assessments. As
mentioned, this is really important as there continue to be many
mitigation, impacts and adaptability studies across the world that
are based on SRES. Fig. 8 also conﬁrms our earlier conclusion that
the RCP set does not cover the complete space of relevant scenarios
for joint adaptation/mitigation analysis.
There are large differences between cells, in terms of storyline
and most likely also probability. The upper left cell will suffer
strong climate impacts (maybe beyond the current knowledge).
The bottom left cell seems to be less probable as it combines a
situation with low mitigative capacity with strong mitigation
action. Similarly, also the upper right cell might be less likely as
conditions for mitigation policy seem to be favorable.
Again, one should realize that the storylines are now deﬁned at
the global level. At the regional level, things may look very
different (and different assumptions may be made within the
overall framework).
5.2. Key issues for reﬁning and applying the framework
Our intention in this paper was to provide an overarching logic
for a scenario framework that would lead to the development of
integrated scenarios for both the mitigation and the ‘vulnerability,
impacts, and adaptation’ research. Many details of the framework
still need to be scrutinized and several key questions will need to
be addressed:
Number of columns. An open question is how many columns
or storylines should be distinguished? At minimum one column is
needed (intermediate assumptions). However, given the impor-
tance of comprehensive impact analysis for different levels of
adaptive capacity and vulnerability, it would be more useful to
consider at least two (high and low) or preferably three levels (low,
intermediate, high) or even four levels (offering a symmetry to the
four RCP levels).
Scenario characterization vs. marker scenarios. Another
question is whether the framework is mostly used as a scenario
heuristic – or whether for each column (or even each cell) speciﬁc
‘‘marker’’ scenarios are deﬁned that are particularly representative
of the type of scenarios within the framework. In the ﬁrst case,
existing scenarios from the literature would be qualiﬁed according
to the framework. In fact, the scientiﬁc community would be
encouraged to submit scenarios to populate the different cells
within the framework based on simple criteria that deﬁne the
columns/cells. In a subsequent step, it would be possible to analyze
the scenarios typical for a certain cell. However, consistency across
cells would be unlikely.
The second approach - use of one speciﬁc set for each column -
would imply that different scenario assessments based on the
framework would use the same internally consistent set of
assumptions, and thus be better comparable and fully integrated.
Obviously, not prescribing these sets would provide a higher level
of ﬂexibility. The two approaches are not mutually exclusive. For
instance, SRES has used the concept of scenario families (covering a
speciﬁc range of assumptions) with single representative marker
Fig. 9. The use of the proposed scenario framework to prioritize scenario analysis.
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columns of our matrix. Given the importance of consistent analysis
in the past, however, we feel that it would be helpful to provide
such markers to the community. If such sets are not provided,
indications of criteria of what ‘‘high GDP’’ constitutes would still
provide a heuristic framework for communication.
Speciﬁcation of the columns. It is an open question whether
the columns would be deﬁned in broad ranges (or criteria) for
population, income and other variables or whether they would be
deﬁned more in qualitative scenario descriptions. Again, this
choice is a trade-off between encouraging consistency across the
scenario literature and allowing for ﬂexibility – and again it might
be possible to use the terminology deﬁned by SRES (marker
scenarios, harmonized scenarios and non-harmonized scenarios).
Origin of data. Should prescribed scenarios of socio-economic
data based on existing model runs be used or should new,
speciﬁcally designed scenarios be developed? Developing new sets
of socio-economic assumptions provides the opportunity to use
the most up-to-date information and expertise on population and
income development (e.g. including the 2009/2010 economic and
ﬁnancial crisis). At the same time, existing scenarios, including the
RCPs, might provide a good representation of the columns.
However, again, consistency is an issue.
Consistency of socio-economic assumptions within a col-
umn or row. Are the socio-economic assumptions exactly the
same within each column? At a minimum it seems desirable to
retain ‘‘vertical consistency’’ by deﬁning a baseline scenario for
each column. This scenario could subsequently be used by a wide
range of integrated assessment models for further mitigation
analysis along each column. Developing the idea of marker
scenarios from above further, it would be possible to use one
storyline and a corresponding marker scenario from a speciﬁc
integrated assessment modeling team as baseline for each column.
Other teams could provide their interpretation of the same
storylines within the column to depict uncertainty bands within
each of the vertical cells.
But, vertical or column consistency alone means that scenarios
are not comparable across rows. This will be particularly the case
with regard to land use and land cover, where differences across
models in their assumed terrestrial policies lead to differences that
are potentially as large as that attributable to climate change. This
loss in comparability could compromise the usefulness of the set of
scenario framework. Theoretically, it would be possible for the
community to select a single representative model for the purpose
of developing a set that has full consistency across columns and
rows. Of course, this leads to a crucial question how to weight
scenario diversity and consistency across the rows.
Climate data. Similarly to different representation of futures by
integrated assessment models, there are multiple climate models
producing ensemble calculations. Without some guidance in
selecting among possible future climate model runs comparability
across climate impact studies could be compromised. Again, one
may raise the question how to weight consistency (by using the
output of a particular climate model) against uncertainty.
Scenario prioritization for ‘vulnerability, impacts, and
adaptation’ analysis. To fully explore the range of possibilities
captured by the proposed framework, twelve cells would have to
be ﬁlled, while for each cell a variety of scenarios and scenario
realizations using different models can be imagined. Such a large
number of scenarios may not only be beyond the capability of the
research community, it could also compromise policy relevance
because of the associated complexity. Therefore, one may propose
certain subset of cells within the framework as priority area for
future assessments (Fig. 9). The priorities might differ for the
impact and mitigation community – and also be depending on
current knowledge. Focusing on the top-left and bottom-rightcorner of the matrix would provide an assessment of the full spread
of impacts, while the other corners in the matrix would span the
full range for mitigation costs. However, the feasibility and
likelihood of some of these boxes are relevant questions. One
crucial element here is whether there is a relationship between
mitigative and adaptive capacity. Important future research may
therefore focus on the question to which degree mitigative and
adaptive capacity indeed co-vary, and under what circumstances
we might expect them to converge/diverse. Adding the middle
column could be used for exploring intermediate levels for either
impacts or the mitigation effort. Together this would lead to a set of
6 priority scenarios in the framework. Similar to the work of the
science community, other scenarios may be given a lower priority
and might only be run in case a model group would have sufﬁcient
capacity. Prioritization clearly comes at a cost – as a full
comparison cannot be made anymore. In that context, it clearly
should be noted that the prioritization suggested in Fig. 9 is just a
ﬁrst proposal, as the downside of this proposal is the reduced
comparison along the horizontal axis.
Time frame. Previous climate change scenario analyses have
mostly focused on the long-term, notably a century timescale. This
is useful, if not essential for long-term stabilization analyses, but
less relevant from the perspective of short to medium term
mitigation and adaptation analysis. It needs to be decided whether
future socio-economic scenarios should more explicitly elaborate
global and regional changes for at least the medium term (2–4
decades) in the context of century timescale scenarios.
6. Conclusions
This paper discussed how a framework for comprehensive
impact and mitigation analysis can be deﬁned consistent with the
RCPs as organizing principle for the second step in the new process
to develop scenarios for climate research (Moss et al., 2010). To do
this, we have ﬁrst deﬁned a set of criteria for the scenario
framework. Second, we have explored whether the socio-economic
scenarios underlying the RCPs can be directly used to form a basis
for the framework – or whether more work would be needed. This
has led to ﬁve conclusions.
The ﬁrst conclusion is that socio-economic scenarios underly-
ing the RCPs are consistent sets of socio-economic assumptions for
each RCP, but together they are not consistent and do not cover the
full range of possible development pathways. The RCPs have been
selected on the basis of their unique characteristics in terms of
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er, not selected for their representation of the literature concerning
socio-economic assumptions. Most of the RCPs represent the
central part of the literature in terms of demographic and
economic assumptions. Therefore, more work is needed if a
scenario framework is to cover a wider range.
The second conclusion is that a broad set of socioeconomic
projections can be consistent with a radiative forcing pathway. In
the literature, there is very little correlation across the emissions
scenarios between the individual assumptions for population and
income and radiative forcing levels. As can be expected, other
uncertainties are far more important for demographic and
economic developments than climate policy. This implies that
the RCP-forcing levels can be combined with a wide variety of
assumptions. There are a few exceptions. For RCP8.5, there has to
be a speciﬁc reason why radiative forcing is relatively high (low
technology development, high coal use and/or high population
levels). For RCP3-PD, there has to be strong climate policy – which
implies that somehow conditions that allow strong climate policy
need to be there.
A third conclusion is that a scenario framework has to be
selective. It needs to make some assumptions to simplify the nearly
inﬁnite possible combinations of socio-economic assumptions at
the global and local level. As shown in the literature review, there is
a very wide range of combinations possible for different
assumptions. Still in most assumptions only a limited set of
scenarios are used and so some common archetype scenarios can
be identiﬁed. Climate research should deﬁne a limited set of
scenarios that directly target the main question of the analysis.
This will require simpliﬁcations.
The new scenario process for climate research and assessment
now calls for the development of a conceptual framework to
provide an overarching logic for the development of socio-
economic scenarios and their use in integrated mitigation and
impact assessments. We believe that the framework, presented
here provides a basis for doing so. We propose a set of scenarios
which could provide a ‘‘thread’’ through the three climate research
communities and which could provide a synthesizing framework.
Our proposed set of scenarios are limited in size, comparable
across scenarios, address a range in vulnerability characteristics,
provide incremental information across climate forcing and
vulnerability states and spans a full century in time scale. We
propose the set of scenarios to be deﬁned across two main axes.
One is deﬁned by the RCP radiative forcing levels (climate signal).
The second axis is deﬁned by socio-economic development – and
comprises elements that affect the capacity for adaptation and
mitigation but also system exposure to climate impacts. In the
paper, we assumed that the second axis is continuous and that
elements that determine adaptive and mitigative capacity corre-
late along this axis. This assumption, however, can be dropped in
which case the second axis simply represents different, relevant,
socio-economic conditions. We think that this framework would
be useful for the identiﬁcation of a limited set of scenarios that can
be used as an analytical thread across a wide range of impact as
well as mitigation assessments. Future scenario assessments based
on the RCPs would therefore strengthen cooperation between
integrated-assessment modelers, climate modelers and the impact
community.
Finally, we propose that a process can be identiﬁed for scenario
development on the basis of the proposed framework. This process
consists of different steps in which the framework is ﬁrst deﬁned in
terms of a minimum set of criteria. Next, scenario groups are
invited to submit scenarios that fall into the framework. Within the
framework we propose to select marker scenarios that can be used
as illustrative examples of the scenarios in each cell/column. At the
same time, these markers would be accompanied by a muchbroader set of scenarios. The creation of this set of scenarios that
create threads will require new work by the integrated assessment
modeling community in cooperation with the ‘vulnerability,
impacts, and adaptation’ community. The detailed work plan
remains to be crafted. But, the architecture, proposed in this paper,
provides the foundation, upon which that plan could be built.
References
Adger, W.N., 2003. Social capital, collective action, and adaptation to climate
change. Economic Geography 79 (4), 387–404.
Berkhout, F., Hertin, J., 2000. Socio-economic futures scenarios for climate impact
assessment. Global Environmental Change 10 (3), 165–168.
Berkhout, F., Hertin, J., Jordan, A., 2002. Socio-economic futures in climate change
impact assessment: using scenarios as ‘learning machines’. Global Environ-
mental Change 12 (2), 83–95.
Brooks, N., Adger, W.N., Kelly, P.M., 2005. The determinants of vulnerability and
adaptive capacity at the national level and the implications for adaptation.
Global Environmental Change Part A 15 (2), 151–163.
Carpenter, S., Pingali, P., 2006. Ecosystems and Human Wellbeing: Scenarios. Island
Press, Washington D.C., USA.
Carter, T.R., Fronzek, S., Ba¨rlund, I., 2004. FINSKEN: a framework for developing
consistent global change scenarios for Finland in the 21st century. Boreal
Environment Research 9, 91–107.
Clarke, L., Edmonds, J., Krey, V., Richels, R., Rose, S., Tavoni, M., 2010. International
climate policy architectures: overview of the EMF 22 international scenarios.
Energy Economics 31 (Suppl. 2), S64–S81.
Clarke, L.E., Edmonds, J.A., Jacoby, H.D., Pitcher, H., Reilly, J.M., Richels, R., 2007.
Scenarios of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Atmospheric Concentrations. Sub-
report 2.1a of Synthesis and Assessment Product 2.1, Climate Change Science
Program and the Subcommittee on Global Change Research, Washington DC.
Edenhofer, O., Knopf, B., Barker, T., Baumstark, L., Bellevrat, E., Chateau, B., Criqui, P.,
Isaac, M., Kitous, A., Kypreos, S., Leimbach, M., Lessmann, K., Magne´, B., Scrieciu,
S., Turton, H., van Vuuren, D.P., 2010. The economics of low stabilization: model
comparison of mitigation strategies and costs. The Energy Journal 31 (SI-1), 11–
48.
Fisher, B., Nakicenovic, N., Alfsen, K., Corfee Morlot, J., De la Chesnaye, F., Hourcade,
J.-C., Jiang, K., Kainuma, M., La Rovere, E., Matysek, A., Rana, A., Riahi, K., Richels,
R., Rose, S., Van Vuuren, D.P., Warren, R., 2007. Issues related to mitigation in the
long-term context. In: Metz, B., Davidson, O., Bosch, P., Dave, R., Meyer, L.
(Eds.), Climate Change 2007 - Mitigation. Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge.
Fu¨ssell, H.M., 2007. Vulnerability: a generally applicable conceptual framework for
climate change research. Global Environmental Change 17, 155–167.
Fu¨ssell, H.M., Klein, R.J.T., 2006. Climate change vulnerability assessments: an
evolution of conceptual thinking. Climatic Change 75, 301–329.
Henrichs, T., Zurek, M., Eickhout, B., Kok, K., Raudsepp-Hearne, C., Ribeiro, T., Van
Vuuren, D.P., Volkery, A., 2010. Scenario development and analysis for forward-
looking ecosystem assessments. In: Ash, N. (Ed.), Ecosystems and Human Well-
being a Manual for Assessment Practitioners. Island Press, Washington DC.
Klein, R.J.T., Huq, S., Denton, F., Downing, T.E., Richels, R.G., Robinson, J.B., Toth, F.L.
(Eds.), 2007. Inter-relationships between adaptation and mitigation. Climate
Change 2007. Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working
Group II. Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, pp. 745–777.
Kriegler, E., O’Neill, B., Hallegatte, S., Kram, T., Lempert, R., Moss, R., Wilbanks, T.,
2010. Socioeconomic scenario development for climate change analysis. CIRED
Working Paper. DT/WP No 2010-23, October 2010.
Martens, P., Lorenzoni, I., Menne, B., 2006. Implications of the SRES scenarios for
human health in Europe, Chapter 11. In: Menne, B., Ebi, K.L. (Eds.), Climate
Change and Adaptation Strategies for Human Health. Springer Steinkopff and
WHO, Darmstadt, pp. 395–407.
Masui, T., Matsumoto, K., Hijioka, Y., Kinoshita, T., Nozawa, T., Ishiwatari, S., Kato, E.,
Shukla, P.R., Yamagata, Y., Kainuma, M., 2011. A emission pathway to stabilize at
6 W/m2 of radiative forcing, Climatic Change, doi:10.1007/s10584-011-0150-5.
Morgan, M.G., Adams, P., Keith, D.W., 2006. Elicitation of expert judgments of
aerosol forcing. Climatic Change 75, 195–214.
Morita, T., Robinson, J., 2001. Greenhouse gas emission mitigation scenarios and
implications. In: Metz, B., Davidson, O., Swart, R., Pan, J. (Eds.), Climate Change
2001: Mitigation. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Moss, R.A., Malone, B.E., 2001. Vulnerability to Climate Change: A Quantitative
Approach. PNNL-SA-33642. Paciﬁc Northwest National Laboratory.
Moss, R., Babiker, M., Brinkman, S., Calvo, E., Carter, T., Edmonds, J., Elgizouli, I.,
Emori, S., Erda, L., Hibbard, K., Jones, R., Kainuma, M., Kelleher, J., Lamarque, J.F.,
Manning, M., Matthews, B., Meehl, G., Meyer, L., Mitchell, J., Nakicenovic, N.,
O’Neill, B., Pichs, T., Riahi, K., Rose, S., Runci, P., Stouffer, R., van Vuuren, D.,
Weyant, J.W.T, van Ypersele, J.P., Zurek, M., 2008. Towards New Scenarios for
Analysis of Emissions, Climate Change, Impacts, and Response Strategies.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Geneva.
Moss, R.H., Edmonds, J.A., Hibbard, K.A., Manning, M.R., Rose, S.K., van Vuuren, D.P.,
Carter, T.R., Emori, S., Kainuma, M., Kram, T., Meehl, G.A., Mitchell, J.F.B.,
Nakicenovic, N., Riahi, K., Smith, S.J., Stouffer, R.J., Thomson, A.M., Weyant,
J.P., Wilbanks, T.J., 2010. The next generation of scenarios for climate change
research and assessment. Nature 463, 747–756.
D.P. van Vuuren et al. / Global Environmental Change 22 (2012) 21–35 35Nakicenovic, N., Swart, R. (Eds.), 2000. Special Report on Emissions Scenarios
(SRES). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Nakicenovic, N., Kolp, P., Riahi, K., Kainuma, M., Hanaoka, T., 2006. Assessment of
emissions scenarios revisited. Environmental Economics and Policy Studies 7
(3), 137–173.
O’Brien, K., Leichenko, R., Kelkar, U., Venema, H., Aandahl, G., Tompkins, H., Javed, A.,
Bhadwal, S., Barg, S., Nygaard, L.J.W., 2004. Mapping vulnerability to multiple
stressors: climate change and economic globalization in India. Global Environ-
mental Change 14 (4), 303–313.
Parry, M.L., Canziani, O.F.,Palutikof, J.P.,van der Linden, P.J.,Hanson, C.E. (Eds.), 2007.
Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of
Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Preston, B.L., Stafford-Smith, M., 2009. Framing vulnerability and adaptive capacity
assessment: discussion paper, CSIRO Climate Adaptation Flagship Working
paper No. 2.
Rao, S., Riahi, K., Stehfest, E., van Vuuren, D., Cheolhung, C., den Elzen, M., Isaac, M.,
van Vliet, J., 2008. IMAGE and MESSAGE Scenarios Limiting GHG Concentration
to Low Levels. IIASA Interim Report IR-08-020 [October 2008, 63 pp.], IIASA,
Laxenbourg.
Riahi, K., Gru¨bler, A., Nakicenovic, N., 2007. Scenarios of long-term socio-economic
and environmental development under climate stabilization. Technological
Forecasting and Social Change 74 (7), 887–935.
Riahi, K., Krey, V., Rao, S., Chirkov, V., Fischer, G., Kolp, P., Kindermann, G., Naki-
cenovic, N., Rafai, P., 2011. RCP-8.5: exploring the consequence of high emission
trajectories. Climatic Change, doi:10.1007/s10584-011-0149-y.
Rounsevell, M.D.A., Reginster, I., Araujo, M.B., Carter, T.R., Dendoncker, N., Ewert, F.,
House, J.I., Kankaanpa¨a¨, S., Leemans, R., Metzger, M.J., Schmit, C., Smith, P., Tuck,
G., 2008. A coherent set of future land use change scenarios for Europe.
Agriculture, Ecosystems and Environment 114 (1), 57–68.
Tavoni, M., Tol, R., 2010. Counting only the hits? The risk of underestimating the
costs of stringent climate policy. Climatic Change 100 (3-4), 769–778.
Thomson, A.M., Calvin, K.V., Smith, S.J., Kyle, G.P., Volke, A., Patel, P., Delgado-Arias,
S., Bond-Lamberty, B., Wise, M.A., Clarke, L.E., Edmonds, J.A., 2011. RCP4.5: a
Pathway for Stabilization of Radiative Forcing by 2100, Climatic Change,
doi:10.1007/s10584-011-0151-4.Toth, F.L., 2003. State of the art and future challenges for integrated environmental
assessment. Integrated Assessment 4, 250–264.
UNEP, 2002. Global Environment Outlook 3. EarthScan, London.
UNEP, 2007. Global Environment Outlook 4. EarthScan, London.
Van Vuuren, D.P., Den Elzen, M.G.J., Lucas, P.L., Eickhout, B., Strengers, B.J., Van
Ruijven, B., Wonink, S., Van Houdt, R., 2007. Stabilizing greenhouse gas con-
centrations at low levels: an assessment of reduction strategies and costs.
Climatic Change 81 (2), 119–159.
van Vuuren, D.P., Edmonds, J., Kainuma, M., Riahi, K., Thomson, A., Hibbard, K., Hurtt,
G.C., Kram, T., Krey, V., Lamarque, J.-F., Matsui, T., Meinshausen, M., Nakicenovic,
N., Smith, S.J., Rose, S.K., 2011a. Representative concentration pathways: an
overview. Climatic Change, doi:10.1007/s10584-011-0148-z.
Van Vuuren, D.P., Stehfest, E., Den Elzen, M.G.J., Deetman, S., Hof, A., Isaac, M., Klein
Goldewijk, K., Kram, T., Mendoza Beltran, A., Oostenrijk, R., Van Vliet, J., Van
Ruijven, B., 2011b. RCP2.6: exploring the possibility to keep global mean
temperature change below 2 degrees. Climatic Change, doi:10.1007/s10584-
011-0152-3.
Van Vuuren, D.P., Kok, M., Girod, B., Lucas, P., De Vries, H.J.M., 2011c. Scenarios in
global environmental assessments: key characteristics and lessons for future
use. Global Environmental Change, submitted for publication
Van Vuuren, D.P., Smith, S.J., Riahi, K., 2010. Downscaling socioeconomic and
emissions scenarios for global environmental change research: a review. WIREs
Climate Change 1 (3).
Watson, B. (Ed.), 2008. International Assessment of Agricultural Science and
Technology Development.. Island Press, Washington D.C., USA.
Weyant, J., Delachesnaye, P., Blanford, G., 2006. An overview of EMF-21: multigas
mitigation and climate change. Energy Journal.
Zickfeld, K., Levermann, A., Kulhbrodt, T., Rahmstorf, S., Morgan, M.G., Keith, D.W.,
2007. Expert judgments on the response of the atlantic meridional overturning
circulation to climate change. Climatic Change 82, 235–265.
Zickfeld, K., Morgan, M.G., Frame, D.J., Keith, D.W., 2010. Expert judgments about
transient climate response to alternative future trajectories of radiative forcing.
PNAS 107, 12451–12456.
Zurek, M., Henrichs, T., 2007. Linking scenarios across geographical scales in
international environmental assessments. Technological Forecasting & Social
Change 74 (8), 1282–1295.
